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ABSTRACT
In this paper we present a model in which endogenous growth arises in competitive
markets. Knowledge is described as a factor used directly in the final goods’ pro-
duction. Firms demand both basic nonrival knowledge contents, which are supplied
jointly and inelastically with raw labor, and further contents supplied by patent
holders. This fact, together with Lindahl prices for knowledge, allows competition
to work, while it also implies that workers’ income share declines overtime. In a first
version of the model with constant cost of knowledge production the first best is
attained. In a further version of the model, in which the cost of knowledge produc-
tion is allowed to change over time and thus intertemporal externalities arise, in a
decentralized economy a second best equilibrium occurs in the transitional period,
while in the long run there is convergence to efficiency.
JEL CLASSIFICATION
C61; E10; O31; O41
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‘Socrates: There are beds and tables in the world—plenty of them, are there not?
Glaucon: Yes.
Socrates: But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other
of a table.
—Plato, The Republic, Book X, dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, 380 BC’
1. Introduction
The motivation for this paper is to further pursue the challenging notion of ‘com-
petitive innovation’, in a framework in which, however, the classical view about the
nonrival nature of knowledge is maintained. In fact, we aim at providing a parsimo-
nious set of assumptions sufficient at supporting the viability of competition in the
whole economy, that is, price taking behavior and zero profits at all levels, as well as
market incentives for R&D activities and thus sustained economic growth. While the
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assumptions we arrive at are demanding, they capture some features that might pre-
vail in the economy thanks to the characteristics that technological change assumed
in the last decades. The first feature we consider is that technical progress leads more
and more to the provision of information goods or knowledge products (Scotchmer
2005) such as computer programs, internet applications, business models, etc., which
are patentable1 and directly usable in the final goods production. It thus seems appro-
priate to assume that knowledge can also enter directly into the final goods production
function, without having to be incorporated into intermediate goods or into labor (as,
e.g., in human capital models).2 This direct penetration of immaterial contents into
final goods production also implies that much more information than in the past is
available to asses the value of the marginal product of knowledge (Gray and Grimaud
2016).
The second feature that we consider is the “routinization” process (Acemoglu and
Autor 2011), which implies the possibility of codifying and automating many tasks—
including cognitive ones—previously performed by workers. Bringing this trend to its
limit, this substitution process in the medium-upper tier of the labor market would
spare only creative tasks, which imply the elaboration of new models and ideas. But
then the suppliers of such ideas need no more to be employees.3 Entrepreneurs who
operate under the protection of laws on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are well
suited to supply knowledge contents. One can thus expect that patented knowledge
has the potential for widely displacing both medium and high-skilled workers. While
on the other hand robotization has in principle the potential for substituting also
the remaining tasks, i.e., those of low-skilled workers, the perspective diffusion and
economic impact of robots is still questioned (Gordon 2014). The problem is mainly
represented by the difficulty of routinization of tasks which require a level of adapt-
ability and responsiveness which is nowadays difficult to achieve. Hence, at least for
a while the process of substitution should spare low-skilled workers, endowed with
the basic levels of knowledge, which are still needed to exploit patented intellectual
contents.4
In this paper, to describe the final goods’ production, we use a general neoclassical
production function Y = F (X,AL)—where Y is a composite consumption good, A
stands for knowledge, L for labor andX for an intermediate good—exhibiting constant
returns to scale in two variables, X and the product (AL). We assume that workers
inelastically supply basic knowledge, representing their inherited common cultural
endowment, jointly with raw labor, while knowledge advances are supplied only by
patent holders. Since intellectual contents coming from these two sources are perfect
substitutes when used in the production of final goods, they are treated as just one
factor, i.e., knowledge, a nonrival but excludable good. Since workers supply of raw
labor and basic knowledge are physically joint and inelastic, they are willing to supply
both factors provided that at least one of them has a positive price. Firms producing
final goods demand just knowledge from both types of providers, while raw labor
1This trend for the U.S. can be dated back to 1998, when in the so called State Street Bank case a business
method was declared patentable. Many other similar rulings followed with respect to software. For patentability
in general see Eckert and Langinier (2013).
2For the case in which labor and individual licences for accessing disembodied knowledge are jointly demanded,
see Marchese and Privileggi (2018).
3We envisage a potential turning point and thus depart from Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) who maintain
that new and more complex tasks for labor can always be created.
4Arrieta Ibarra et al. (2017) stress also the role of data produced by human interactions in the generation of
information useful for Machine Learning. They envisage a world of “Data as Labor”, where workers are identified
with the suppliers of such information, i.e., of basic intangible intellectual contents, and paid accordingly.
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represents an externality of basic knowledge.
A technical ingredient that renders competition viable and efficiently allocates work-
ers to the single firms, internalizing the externality, is represented by the Lindahl prices
paid by the final goods’ sector to compensate the suppliers of knowledge. As will be-
come more clear in Section 3.4, the larger the firm’s dimension in terms of output (and
thus the larger the number of workers it hires), the larger its revealed demand price for
knowledge (since raw labor acts as a multiplier of the marginal product of knowledge);
but a larger Lindahl price implies also a larger firm’s payment for the workers’ basic
knowledge, or, so to say, a larger “payroll”. Hence, Lindahl prices support the exact
equivalent of a competitive labor market equilibrium.
The key idea about the viability of competition in the R&D market may be sum-
marized as follows. Final good producers (in large number), besides the intermediate
good X demand only knowledge A and are eager to pay the Lindahl price; patent hold-
ers (in large number) are willing to rent the positive stock of knowledge they already
own whenever its price is positive. The price arises from the intersection between the
(strictly decreasing) demand for knowledge with knowledge supply, where the latter is
fixed at each instant because it originates from the available stock of already patented
inventions, whose services, unlike in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, are assumed to be per-
fect substitutes when used in production. Future Lindahl prices, when discounted at
any previous instant according to the market interest rate, turn out to cover the cost
of producing new inventions by R&D firms, which are thus incentivized to undertake
research activities and eventually allow sustained endogenous growth of the economy.
As R&D activities occur under a free entry condition, R&D firms earn zero profits
and are thus competitive like any other actor in the economy, specifically, the firms in
the final good sector.
While in the basic version of the model knowledge used in production is fully ex-
cludable, so that the first best is reached, in a further version externalities arise and a
second best result is attained in the transitional period. Even in the latter case, how-
ever, in the long run the decentralized solution converges to the optimal Asymptotic
Balanced Growth Path (ABGP).
Our results contribute to the debate about the motivations of the decline of the in-
come share of labor at the advantage of the share going to intangibles and particularly
to holders of patents, a stylized fact that has attracted much attention (Corrado, Hul-
ten, and Sichel 2009; Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014; Koh, Santaeula`lia-Llopis, and
Zheng 2016). A novel contribution of the paper is actually that of providing a rationale
for a declining workers’ income share in a growing competitive economy. This result
arises because, as economic growth proceeds, the share of knowledge owned by patent
holders increases, as knowledge grows only thanks to research protected by IPRs.
The paper is organized as follows: after a discussion of the related literature in
Paragraph 2, in Section 3 the basic model is presented and its static equilibrium is
thoroughly described, while Section 4 is devoted to the ensuing dynamic equilibrium. In
Section 5 we consider the case in which the cost of knowledge production is not constant
overtime, establishing that the decentralized equilibrium attains Pareto optimality
only in the long-run. Finally, Section 6 reports some conclusions. All mathematical
proofs are postponed in the Appendix.
2. Discussion on Related Literature
Hellwig and Irmen (2001) and Boldrin and Levine (2008) are among the notable excep-
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tions to the mainstream paradigm in the endogenous growth literature, which main-
tains that a non-competitive market must occur somewhere in the economy, in order
to provide private economic incentives for research.5 Hellwig and Irmen (2001) show
that atomless competitive markets in the production sector can finance the fixed cost
of research out of inframarginal rents, an opportunity allowed by strictly increasing
marginal costs at the level of each individual firm. In their model, the returns from
innovation are privately appropriable only in the introductory period. Information
about new findings spills over afterward, thus paving the way for further innovation in
all the firms, with increasing returns at the aggregate level and economic growth. The
presence of externalities implies, however, that the first best is not achieved. Boldrin
and Levine (2008), instead, depart from the assumption of ideas as nonrival goods by
noting that the means of access to knowledge (such as the template of a new good) are
rival and excludable. Moreover, replicating the first copy is time-consuming, and this
fact, coupled with the impatience of consumers, implies that in a competitive market
a scarcity rent will be paid by buyers. The inventor can thus sell the first copy at a
price—which depends on the value of the services it delivers in terms of consumption
and of replicability into further copies—earning a rent that may be sufficiently large to
finance the indivisible cost born to produce the innovation. Whenever research activity
can be financed this way, economic growth becomes viable even if the inventor is not
granted a patent and thus has no IPR over further copies.
Our contribution exploits some hints from the Boldrin and Levine approach, while
developing them into a more standard endogenous growth model, in which knowledge
is described as a continuous excludable public good. In fact, even if Boldrin and Levine
criticize the common tenet on the public good nature of knowledge, one might ratio-
nalize as Lindahl prices the rents they consider, as the latter derive from multiple uses
of one initial invention. However, Lindahl prices in the Boldrin and Levine model are
paid jointly with the cost of each copy, i.e., a private rival good, while we consider
disembodied knowledge instead. Equilibria based on Lindahl prices are often deemed
unrealistic because of the problem of “ revelation” of demand. Boldrin and Levine
do not systematically tackle this problem: they just quote examples supporting the
idea that in general rents will be large enough to finance most useful innovations. We
explicitly tackle the problem of demand revelation.
As for knowledge use, following an approach similar to ours, also Chantrel, Grimaud,
and Tournemaine (2012) assume that disembodied knowledge is being directly used
in the production of final goods. Although starting from different assumptions, they
show as well that competition in the market for knowledge is sustainable under perfect
excludability and with Lindahl prices, so that the distortion caused by knowledge
spillovers vanishes. However, Chantrel, Grimaud, and Tournemaine (2012) assume
that the final goods’ production occurs under increasing returns, so that competition
is not viable in that market.
3. Constant Cost of Knowledge Production
Our model is a Ramsey-type model of growth with endogenous creation of knowledge.
The economy is composed of households, firms and the government. Households receive
5The idea that market power is necessary for inducing costly research dates back to Schumpeter (1911). It
was brought up again in the ’90s by many papers (besides Romer 1990, see, e.g., also Grossman and Helpman
1991, Peretto 1996 and Aghion and Howitt 1998) and subsequently it has become a widely shared tenet in the
literature on endogenous economic growth.
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compensations for supplying inputs to the production sector, purchase a composite
consumption good, which also represents the numeraire, and choose how much to save
in order to accumulate new knowledge. There are two types of firms: one performing
knowledge creation activities (R&D-firms) and one producing the final consumption
good (F -firms).
3.1. Households
We shed population growth6 and assume that the size of the economy—i.e., the to-
tal number of households—is constant. We adopt the standard assumption that all
households have the same rate of time preference, ρ > 0, and an identical increasing
and concave instantaneous utility function.
Assumption 3.1. The aggregate representative consumer is endowed with an in-
stantaneous objective u (C), where C is aggregate consumption, with u′ (C) > 0 and
u′′ (C) < 0.
Households’ goal consists of choosing consumption in order to maximize their own
lifetime discounted utility subject to the usual asset accumulation constraint, and their
initial common knowledge endowment A (0) = A0 > 0. Knowledge is assumed to be a
nonrival good. The initial knowledge endowment A0 belongs to the households in the
sense that they share it as a part of their cultural heritage. A0, however, is excludable
whenever its productive uses involving firms are considered, and each household is
entitled to an equal share of the compensations the firms must pay for its exploitation.7
Households supply A0 to the final good producers at all instants t ≥ 0 jointly with
constant raw labor8 L (t) ≡ L. Thanks to such joint inelastic supply of L and A0,
workers are willing to provide raw labor even if they are compensated only as owners of
their initial knowledge endowment A0, whenever such compensation is strictly positive.
As the representative household earns only royalties from renting knowledge to F -
firms, she faces the following maximization problem,
max
[C(t)]∞
t=0
∫ +∞
0
u [C (t)] e−ρt dt (1)
subject to B˙ (t) = r (t)B (t)− C (t) ,
where B (t) denotes an asset that will be specified later on and r (t) is the market rate
of return on assets, with the additional constraint 0 ≤ C (t) ≤ r (t)B (t), for a given
initial asset level B (0) = B0 > 0. Standard analysis of the (concave) current-value
Hamiltonian associated to (1) yields the following necessary condition of optimality,
which is the well-known Euler equation:
C˙ (t)
C (t)
=
1
εu [C (t)]
[r (t)− ρ] , (2)
where 1/εu (C) = −u
′ (C) / [u′′ (C)C] is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
6For an extension in which population growth is considered see the working paper version of this paper
(Marchese and Privileggi 2016).
7By a continuity argument, the knowledge endowment of workers at the initial instant of time provides a
marginal benefit and commands a price equal to that of the further contents produced under patents’ protection.
8For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that labor L is a continuous variable.
5
3.2. R&D Sector
Throughout the whole paper we will resort to the standard simplified approach that
describes aggregate knowledge creation as a deterministic process. That is, we assume
that there is no aggregate uncertainty in the innovation process while, of course, there
may be idiosyncratic uncertainty.9 In order to obtain an infinitely lived and fully
enforced patent, each idea produced by a R&D-firm must be new and differentiated,
while, as will be clarified in the next section, when knowledge is used by the F -firms
it behaves as a homogeneous good.
In this first version of the model we simplify things by considering a constant cost
of new knowledge production, an assumption that will be relaxed later on.
Assumption 3.2. Each new idea can be produced at a constant unit cost, η (t) ≡
η > 0.
Under Assumption 3.2 the innovation possibilities frontier is given by
A˙ =
J
η
, (3)
where J represents investment in new knowledge production. We shall assume that
there is free entry into R&D activities, that is, any individual or firm can spend one
unit of its wealth at time t to generate a flow rate 1/η of new ideas. Every R&D-firm
produces new knowledge and aims at profit maximization. Free entry in the business of
producing new ideas implies that profits must be zero in equilibrium. Hence, the value
of the patent associated to each (differentiated) unit of new knowledge purchased by
households at instant t corresponds to the same constant: η > 0.
3.3. Producing Sector
In the final good sector F -firms are competitive and operate in a standard neoclassical
framework: at each instant t F -firm i employs a composite intermediate good and
knowledge-augmented labor to produce a composite consumption good according to
a neoclassical production function, Yi = F (Xi, AiLi). The intermediate good X is
made up of final goods destined to production, so that its price is the numeraire,
pX = 1, while L is raw labor provided by a large and constant population and A
denotes knowledge. Recall that knowledge is assumed to be nonrival and perfectly
excludable.10 Specifically, from the F -firms perspective A is an aggregate composition
of perfect substitutes, implying that whichever new idea is added to the stock, it has
the same marginal productivity of all other ideas—including those forming the initially
inherited endowment A0. Knowledge can be directly used in production, while labor
L augments its productivity. Because labor is supplied inelastically and jointly with
the initial knowledge A0, while all other inputs are for sale, F -firms demand only
the intermediate goods X and knowledge A. Input X is bought on the market, while
knowledge is rented from a large set of suppliers, i.e., both from workers—who own the
initial endowment A0—and from patent holders—who own the patents on knowledge
supplied by R&D-firms after the initial instant t = 0.
As will become clearer in the following, the amount of raw labor needed to pro-
duce each firm’s output amount, Yi, is being supplied for free according to the firm’s
9See, e.g., pp. 428–429 in Acemoglu (2009).
10F -firms cannot re-rent knowledge or share it with other firms; that is, no arbitrage is allowed.
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knowledge demand.
Assumption 3.3. F (·, ·) is concave and linearly homogenous, with F1 > 0, F2 > 0,
F11 < 0 and F22 < 0, where Fj and Fjj denote the first-order and second-order partial
derivatives with respect to arguments j = 1, 2 respectively. Moreover, the standard
Inada conditions hold for both arguments.
Consistently to the fact that each firm’s maximization problem has only two decision
variables, X and A, Assumption 3.3 rules out increasing returns to scale at the level
of the single firm. Assumption 3.3 also postulates decreasing returns to knowledge for
the production function F . This can be rationalized by considering that the transfer of
knowledge from the research sector to the final good’s production involves a rescaling in
order to take into account its decreasing effectiveness in terms of output augmentation,
due, e.g., to partial substitution of previously used results with new knowledge.
Because households own the whole knowledge stock A—the initial endowment A0
plus the amount (A−A0) purchased from R&D-firms—they are willing to supply
the whole lot provided that they can earn a strictly positive price on it. Specifically,
denoting by A the aggregate demand for knowledge, by A∗ the whole endowment
available in the economy and by pA the rental price of knowledge, the market clearing
conditions for knowledge can be written in complementary slackness form as
A ≤ A∗, pA ≥ 0 and (A∗ −A) pA = 0,
which imply A = A∗ whenever pA > 0, as will be the case in the following. Indeed, in
the instantaneous market equilibrium knowledge can be considered in fixed supply, as
it is a stock variable: hence, at each instant, the equilibrium price pA depends only on
demand. However, knowledge is a nonrival good; therefore, all F -firms can be supplied
at the same time with the whole stock A∗ available, and the subscript i can be dropped
from the amount of knowledge employed in their production function.
Let us reformulate firm i output as
Yi = ALif
( x
A
)
, with f (·) = F (·, 1) , (4)
where11 x = Xi/Li is the per capita intermediate good. As Assumption 3.3 envisages
linear homogeneity, the scale and the number of firms are indeterminate, so that we
can assume without loss of generality that at each instant t there is a large number of
firms, sayM (t), and several, sayN (t) < M (t), output levels Yi (t), for i = 1, . . . , N (t),
each corresponding to a different amount Li of raw labor employed, that are being
produced by mi (t) identical firms operating at the same level, with mi (t) ≥ m > 0
where m is a number sufficiently large to sustain a competitive market. Therefore, at
each instant t the economy is populated by M (t) =
∑N(t)
i=1 mi (t) firms producing a
total amount Y (t) =
∑N(t)
i=1 mi (t)Yi (t) of final consumption good.
12 If N (t) = 1 then
M (t) = m1 (t) and Y (t) = m1 (t)Y1 (t). Knowledge suppliers can observe the firms’
size and thus tell apart each mi (t) group of firms.
11All firms employ the same intermediate good/labor ratio, x ≡ xi = Xi/Li, as will become clear in the sequel.
12Alternatively, one can assume that there is a continuum of output levels Y (i, t) ≥ 0, i ∈ [0, N (t)], each
produced by a density m (i, t) ≥ 0 of identical F -firms, so that the economy is populated by an absolutely
continuous distribution of firms over the compact support [0, N (t)], and total output is given by Y (t) =
∫
N(t)
0 m (i, t)Y (i, t) di. Note that when m (i, t) > 0 there is a continuum of firms each producing Y (i, t), thus
assuring that such sub-market is competitive, while if m (i, t) = 0 there are no firms producing the Y (i, t) level.
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The FOC for each F -firm’s profit maximization are:
∂Yi
∂Xi
= f ′
( x
A
)
= 1 (5)
∂Yi
∂A
= Li
[
f
( x
A
)
−
x
A
f ′
( x
A
)]
= Liγ
( x
A
)
= pAi . (6)
Condition (5) holds because the intermediate goods are priced at the numeraire, while
in condition (6) the term γ (x/A) denotes the equilibrium royalty per augmented
worker, which depends on the ratio x/A. Condition (6) shows that the equilibrium
price for knowledge, pAi , is the firm i demand price evaluated at the given amount
A = A∗.
3.4. Lindahl Prices
As there are many F -firms operating at each output level Yi, one can identify N (t)
independent and competitive sub-markets for knowledge. In each sub-market, the de-
mand price is scaled by the raw labor amount Li needed to produce its representative
firm specific output size, Yi, according to (4). Because A is nonrival and inelastically
supplied, all the sub-markets clear at the same amount A = A∗. However, because
F -firms demand prices are scaled according to Li, the knowledge equilibrium rental
price in each sub-market will differ accordingly; in other words, pAi = Liγ (x/A) are
Lindahl prices.13 Households who invested in new patented knowledge receive pay-
ments from all the firms in the economy and earn a share of total output, Y , given
by Lγ (x/A) (A−A0) /Y , while, in their role of workers who rent A0 to all F -firms,
households receive Lγ (x/A)A0/Y .
14
Figure 1 shows how Lindahl prices form for two hypothetical sub-markets i = 1, 2.
Without loss of generality, suppose that there is a continuum of firms in each sub-
market, both with mass m1 = m2 = 1. While all the firms in each sub-market have
the same size, sub-market 1 is populated by firms which are smaller in size than those
operating in sub-market 2, that is, Y1 < Y2, so that, according to (4), L1 < L2.
Lindahl prices pAi = Liγ (x/A
∗), for i = 1, 2, are determined by the intersection of
the marginal products of knowledge given by ∂Yi/∂A = Liγ (x/A)—which, for fixed
Li and x = Xi/Li, is the representative firm’s demand for knowledge in the i
th sub-
market15 as a function of the only variable A—with the amount A∗ in fixed supply.
According to Assumption 3.3, the demand functions Liγ (x/A) are decreasing in A
when Li and x = Xi/Li are kept constant. The upper black demand curve in Figure
1 refers to the whole knowledge market; it is obtained as the “vertical sum” of the
sub-markets’ demands, yielding the sum of Lindahl prices for knowledge in the whole
economy for any given A. At the intersection point of the total market demand with
the amount A∗ inelastically supplied, the royalty for knowledge—that is, the Lindahl
price of the whole lot A∗—is determined as pA = Lγ (x/A∗x), where L = L1 + L2.
In Figure 1 also the inelastic supply of the basic knowledge endowment, A0, is
13A similar approach has been pursued in Chantrel, Grimaud, and Tournemaine (2012) with reference to
knowledge demanded by producers of differentiated goods, each one with its specific sub-market and Lindahl
price. They also show that under perfect information and full excludability this is the only market equilibrium.
14See Example 1 in the working paper version of this paper (Marchese and Privileggi 2016) for an illustration
on how Lindahl prices are determined when production is Cobb-Douglas.
15As m1 = m2 = 1, in Figure 1 the representative firm’s demand coincides with the total sub-market demand.
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L1γ (x/A)
L2γ (x/A)
Lγ (x/A)
Figure 1. Equilibrium Lindahl prices in the two sub-markets, pA1 , p
A
2 , and in the whole knowledge market,
pA, as the intersection between sub-markets knowledge demand functions L1γ (x/A), L2γ (x/A), and the whole
demand function Lγ (x/A), with the inelastic supply function A ≡ A∗.
plotted as a dashed vertical line to the left of the total supply A∗. Denoting by
h = A0/L
the (constant) amount of initial knowledge endowment that can figuratively be as-
signed to each agent in proportion to its share of property rights,16 and after conve-
niently rescaling L through factor h, A0 can alternatively be interpreted as the inelastic
raw labor supply A0 = hL. Hence, when the knowledge market is in equilibrium—i.e.,
when the whole A0 is rented at the royalty p
A = (L1 + L2) γ (x/A
∗)—also the total
labor force, which is jointly supplied, must be employed.
Lindahl prices turn out to be proportional to labor employed by each firm i, that
is:
pAi
pA
=
Liγ (x/A
∗)
(L1 + L2) γ (x/A∗)
=
Li
L
.
Thus, an equilibrium of the market for knowledge also implies an allocation of workers
to each firm corresponding to its relative Lindahl price. This allocation is viable be-
cause it implies that each worker receives the same compensation γ (x/A∗)A0 and is
thus properly compensated according to her share 1/L of ownership of each idea be-
longing to the basic knowledge endowment A0. Hence, in this decentralized equilibrium
firms both pay a price for knowledge and employ a number of workers corresponding
to their size in terms of final goods’ production (or, in other words, according to the
sub-market to which they belong), and both knowledge and raw labor are fully and
efficiently allocated.
While in general the resort to Lindahl prices for public goods is deemed unattainable
due to the lack of proper information, in this case the observable size of each firm
16Note that agents share the ownership of the cultural heritage, which is collective and not excludable for
them. Property rights on subsets of A0 cannot be assigned.
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renders it possible to ascribe it to a specific sub-market, and all the suppliers of
knowledge can easily identify such sub-markets and the demand arising therein. The
demand revelation problem is in general less severe when the public good is an input
than when it is a consumption good, as demand in the former case derives from the
profit function while in the latter it derives from the utility function which has a lower
degree of measurability (Dasgupta 2001).
According to (5) and (6) the per capita product yi = Yi/Li = Af (x/A) is fully
distributed to the per capita intermediate good, x = Xi/Li, and knowledge, A, that
is,
yi − x− γ (x/A)A = Af (x/A)− f
′ (x/A)x−Af (x/A) + xf ′ (x/A) = 0,
so that each firm (and thus the whole industry) makes no profit. Households, either in
their role of workers as suppliers of A0 or as holders of the patents covering (A−A0),
are paid according to their entitlements. Because in the market for final goods all firms
face the same rental price for intermediate goods and face Lindahl prices for knowledge,
all use the same combination of intermediate goods and knowledge-augmented labor.
We thus refer in the following to a representative firm and drop the subscript i.
3.5. A Rationale for the Absence of Raw Labor Compensation
Our approach relies on the assumption of rational expectations, where all agents make
all their plans on the basis of expectations about future prices. In our model positive
prices for both labor and knowledge are not sustainable under competition, since
the production function of final goods Yi = F (Xi, AiLi) implies that the output is
exhausted whenever, in addition to the intermediate good X, either knowledge or
raw labor are paid according to their marginal product. Hence, provided that only
one of these two prices can be positive, we now argue that workers turn out to be
indifferent between which one it is, while the household, as the owner of the whole A
and beneficiary of technical progress, prefers a positive price for knowledge.
Indeed, at instant t = 0 both workers and firms are indifferent between a com-
pensation based on the marginal value of either raw labor or knowledge. To see
this, recall from (6) that ∂Yi/∂A = Liγ (x/A), while differentiating the produc-
tion function (4) with respect to Li yields the marginal product of raw labor as
∂Yi/∂Li = A [f (x/A)− (x/A) f
′ (x/A)] = Aγ (x/A), from which we infer that only
the scale in which the marginal product is measured changes from Li to A. The
effect of this change of scale is cancelled out, however, whenever the total compen-
sation received by all workers is calculated as if they were paid for raw labor, as∑N(t)
i=1 mi (t)LiAγ (x/A) = ALγ (x/A) = Ap
A, where pA =
∑N(t)
i=1 mi (t)Liγ (x/A) =
Lγ (x/A) is the total payment based on Lindahl prices.
As long as workers accept of being paid according to their knowledge endow-
ment from the outset, their total compensation stays put forever at A0Lγ (x/A0).
On the other hand, the total compensation accruing to knowledge changes through
time and is given by AtLγ (x/At). In the following Section 4 it will be shown that
γ (x/At) turns out to be constant through time, so that, whenever the knowledge
stock keeps piling up as time elapses and the economy exhibits sustained growth,
AtLγ (x/At) ≥ A0Lγ (x/A0) holds for all t > 0. However, while only patents’ owners
benefit from such increase, from the raw labor supply perspective being paid as owners
of knowledge A0 let workers not worse-off than being paid for the supply of L; this
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is because the implication in the latter case is that no knowledge advance can occur
after the initial instant t = 0, as a zero compensation left to knowledge annihilates any
incentive to innovate by R&D-firms. Therefore, the stagnation of total labor income
at A0Lγ (x/A0) would occur all the same.
As we are interested in describing a growing competitive economy in which there is
a market supply of inventions, we assume that firms demand knowledge A from the
outset and workers are willing to supply A0 joint with raw labor.
The absence of a specific price for raw labor does not imply efficiency losses, be-
cause raw labor is inelastically supplied and efficiently allocated. One might also liken
knowledge-augmented labor AL to human capital, but in our model the scale through
which human capital is evaluated is provided by the embodied knowledge contents,
which, notwithstanding such embodiment, are still homogeneous with respect to the
dematerialized contents protected by patents. Because in our economy the dematerial-
ization process is prevailing, only the basic human capital—embedding just the initial
knowledge endowment A0—is demanded.
One implication of the model is that the benefits of technological progress are fun-
neled to the owners of the intangible capital protected by patents, while workers’
compensation is stagnating as it is linked to the original knowledge endowment. The
negative consequence of the model with respect to workers’ income takes to the ex-
treme a tendency that might be inferred from the stylized facts pertaining to the long
term evolution of income shares. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009), e.g., show that
labor’s income share decreased significantly over the last 50 years in the US, provided
that investments in intangibles and their income share are properly accounted for. The
negative effects implied by our model on workers’ income might be mitigated if one
assumed that the role of worker and that of new knowledge provider can overlap. With
an increasing common cultural endowment,17 the income share accruing to workers
would increase.
4. Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 4.1. A feasible allocation in this economy is a set of time paths of con-
sumption levels [C (t)]∞t=0, intermediate goods’ flows [X (t)]
∞
t=0, aggregate R&D expen-
ditures [J (t)]∞t=0, and knowledge stock levels [A (t)]
∞
t=0, such that, at each instant t ≥ 0,
the aggregate resource constraint, C (t)+X (t)+J (t) ≤ F [X (t) , A (t)L], is satisfied,
while new knowledge production occurs according to A˙ (t) η (t) ≤ J (t), where η (t) is
the amount of final goods technically needed to produce 1 unit of A (t).
In order to incentivize all households to invest in new knowledge production, while
keeping the knowledge market in intertemporal equilibrium, under Assumption 3.2 the
following free-entry condition must hold:
V (t) =
∫ +∞
t
γ (v)Le−
∫
v
t
r(s) ds dv = η. (7)
It postulates that the present value [r (t) is the instantaneous interest rate] of future
royalties, Γ (t) = γ (t)L, where γ (t) denotes the equilibrium royalty per worker at
instant t, must be equal to the (constant) production cost η of a unit of new knowledge.
17In Cozzi (1998) the dynamic of such common cultural endowment is endogenized by a market for non-
technical education.
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Because the only asset in the economy is expressed in terms of the knowledge stock
A owned by households, a first consequence of (7) is that B (t) = V (t)A (t) = ηA (t)
must hold.
Definition 4.2. An equilibrium is a feasible allocation in which the evolution of
[A (t)]∞t=0 is determined by free entry in a competitive market for R&D, the evolu-
tion of [r (t)]∞t=0 is consistent with the free entry property, the evolution of [C (t)]
∞
t=0
is consistent with household maximization, both R&D-firms and F -firms maximize
their profit, Lindahl prices
[
pAi (t)
]∞
t=0
clear each sub-market for knowledge when all
F -firms use the whole available stock A and the optimal number of workers Li, the
royalties
[
pA (t)
]∞
t=0
clear the whole market for knowledge with full employment of
raw labor. In other words, in equilibrium at each instant t ≥ 0, J (t) is consistent with
(7) while [C (t) , r (t)] satisfy the Euler equation (2) and the transversality condition
limt→+∞B (t) e
−rt = limt→+∞ ηA (t) e
−rt = 0 holds.
As, under Assumption 3.3, the derivative of function f defined in (4) is decreasing,
f ′ is invertible and from (5) we get the demand for the intermediate good x by the
F -firms, which turns out to be linear in A:
x = δA, with δ =
(
f ′
)−1
(1) . (8)
Thus, δ is a constant uniquely defined by the choice of the production function F (·, ·).
As the ratio δ ≡ x/A is constant, from (6) we obtain the per capita willingness to pay
for knowledge, which turns out to be constant as well:
γ
( x
A
)
≡ γ = f (δ)− δf ′ (δ) = f (δ)− δ, (9)
where in the third equality we used the definition of δ in (8).
Hence, we can use the fact that, according to (9), γ is constant and differentiate
both sides in (7) with respect to t to get
V˙ (t) = r (t)
∫ +∞
t
γLe−
∫
v
t
r(s) ds dv−γL = 0,
which implies that the present value of future royalties does not change in time and,
after substituting the integral with (7), the equilibrium interest rate regulating the
transfer of wealth through time (via the only state variable, which is the knowledge
A) is constant as well, r (t) ≡ r, and given by
r =
γL
η
. (10)
In order to use (2) to look for a balanced growth path (BGP) type of equilibrium,
we must assume that 1/εu (C) = 1/σ is a constant,
18 with σ > 0. Hence, using (10)
in (2) we obtain the following constant rate of growth of consumption, C, knowledge,
18If we are interested in an asymptotic balanced growth path (ABGP) it is sufficient to assume that
limt→+∞ [1/εu (C)] = limt→+∞ {−u′ (C) / [u′′ (C)C]} = 1/σ. This approach will be pursued in Section 5.
12
A, and output, Y , along the BGP:
g =
C˙
C
=
A˙
A
=
Y˙
Y
=
1
σ
(
γL
η
− ρ
)
. (11)
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1–3.3 hold and the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution is constant—i.e., εu (C) = − [u
′′ (C)C] /u′ (C) ≡ σ > 0. Then,
if
γL > ρη and (1− σ) γL < ρη, (12)
the economy admits a unique BGP along which knowledge, output, and consumption
all grow at the same rate g > 0 given by (11). Moreover, there are no transition
dynamics: the economy immediately jumps on the BGP starting from t = 0.
The novelty introduced by assuming that F -firms, operating under constant returns
to scale, pay for the use of knowledge through Lindahl prices both to compensate
patent holders and suppliers of basic knowledge joint with raw labor, together with
Assumption 3.2 of a constant cost for new knowledge production, allows for the solution
characterized in Proposition 4.3 to be Pareto optimal even in a totally decentralized
setting.
Proposition 4.4. The BGP equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4.3 is Pareto
optimal.
Three features of our model are crucial to explain Proposition 4.4.
(1) As knowledge is paid its Lindahl price there is no room for monopolistic power
exploitation in the economy as in the standard literature, that is, nowhere mark-
ups are being applied. Actually, one can read (7) as a dynamic version of the
famous Samuelson rule for public goods, since it establishes the equality between
the present value of the sum (the integral) of the marginal benefits of knowledge
and the marginal cost of knowledge production. This implies that knowledge is
efficiently provided, as the same choices that a social planner would have made
with respect to knowledge accumulation emerge in a decentralized setting.
(2) The stagnation of workers’ income, due to the fact that knowledge increases are
provided only by patent holders, would be particularly problematic in an econ-
omy in which, unlike that described in this paper, the population were composed
by two groups: workers (endowed only with labor L and A0), who consume their
all income, and holders of the remaining assets, who consume and save. While
we leave for future research the study of this case, one can guess that in this
economy an evolution of income shares according to the pattern described so far
is likely to prompt protests against the raising income inequality and give rise
to social pressure for redistributive policies.
(3) Finally, Assumption 3.2, by postulating a constant unit cost η for the produc-
tion of new ideas, rules out intertemporal knowledge spillovers or other types of
externalities. Our next step is to relax this assumption.
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5. Non Constant Cost of Knowledge Production
An example of a well-known model in which the cost of knowledge production turns
out to be constant like in our simple setting discussed in the previous section is the
celebrated original contribution by Romer (1990). However, as most of the major con-
tributions that followed Romer’s seminal paper confirm, it is widely accepted that
Assumption 3.2 introduces a definitely unrealistic restriction. For instance, Tsur and
Zemel (2007) consider a continuous-time version of the original model by Weitzman
(1998) in which knowledge evolves according to a recombinant technology character-
ized by a variable unit cost of knowledge production,
η (t) = ϕ [A (t)] , (13)
in which the unit cost function ϕ (·) indirectly depends on time through the knowledge
stock A (t) evolution. The recombinant knowledge production function by Weitzman
is well suited for our approach because it assumes that its main input is expressed in
terms of financial resources,19 J (t). Hence, while we keep the assumption of Section
3 that there is no aggregate uncertainty in the innovation process, in this section we
allow the unit cost of knowledge production, η, to vary over time.
Assumption 5.1. Each new idea can be produced at a time-dependent unit cost,
η (t) > 0.
According to Assumption 5.1, define the innovation possibilities frontier as
A˙ (t) =
J (t)
η (t)
, (14)
in which time-dependence has been emphasized.20
From the representative household optimization problem (1) we get the same nec-
essary Euler condition as in (2). Also, nothing changes from the point of view of
knowledge demand: the per augmented worker royalty is still constant and, according
to (9), given by γ (x/A) ≡ γ = f (δ)− δ. Only the free-entry condition (7) changes, as
now the RHS depends on time:
V (t) =
∫ +∞
t
γ (v)Le−
∫
v
t
r(s) ds dv = η (t) . (15)
Differentiating it with respect to time leads to
V˙ (t) = r (t)
∫ +∞
t
γLe−
∫
v
t
r(s) ds dv−γL = η˙ (t) ,
19As a matter of fact, all mainstream extensions of Romer’s model implicitly assume time-dependent costs of
producing new ideas. In such a framework, increasing research costs can even offset scale effects (Cozzi and
Spinesi 2004). However, like Romer’s one, all these models are based on knowledge production functions that
use labor as a main input factor, so that the cost of new knowledge depends on the equilibrium wage. Because,
according to (3) and (14), in our setting we assume that knowledge is produced through financial investment
rather than labor, these contributions are not directly comparable with our model.
20Note that (14) encompasses also the case in which new knowledge is being produced by decentralized R&D-
firms for a price η (t) = ψ [A (t)] that includes a mark-up over the Tsur and Zemel (2007) first-best cost ϕ [A (t)],
as in Marchese et al. (2017).
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which, after substituting the integral with (15), yields the interest rate
r (t) =
γL
η (t)
+
η˙ (t)
η (t)
. (16)
Note that, although the total royalty Γ = γL remains constant, under Assumption 5.1
the interest rate varies in time according to the law of motion of η (t).
Because from (15) V (t) = η (t), equation (16) can be rewritten in the familiar form
of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation,
r (t)V (t) = γL+ V˙ (t) , (17)
in which the evolution through time of knowledge’s value takes into account the assets’
gains/ losses V˙ (t) = η˙ (t) due to variations in the new knowledge’s cost η (t).
Using (16) in (2) we obtain the following time-dependent growth rate of consump-
tion:
g (t) =
C˙ (t)
C (t)
=
1
εu [C (t)]
[
γL
η (t)
+
η˙ (t)
η (t)
− ρ
]
. (18)
As, by construction, this version of the model exhibits transition dynamics, we look
for an Asymptotic Balanced Growth Path (ABGP) type of equilibrium. To this
aim, we assume that asymptotically the intertemporal elasticity of substitution be-
comes constant, while the growth rate of the unit cost of new knowledge is required
to vanish in the long-run; that is, we set limt→+∞ [1/εu (C)] = 1/σ, σ > 0, and
limt→+∞ [η˙ (t) /η (t)] = 0. Note that this setting is sufficiently general to encompass
any type of new knowledge production function, envisaging either increasing or de-
creasing η (t) along transition dynamics, while asymptotically the unit cost of new
knowledge must converge to some positive constant, limt→+∞ η (t) = η
∗ > 0, in order
to satisfy the transversality condition for a solution of problem (1).
Proposition 5.2. Under Assumptions 3.1, 3.3 and 5.1, assume that
limt→+∞ [1/εu (C)] = 1/σ, σ > 0, and limt→+∞ η (t) = η
∗ > 0. Then, if
γL > ρη∗ and (1− σ) γL < ρη∗, (19)
then the economy admits a unique ABGP along which knowledge, output, and con-
sumption all grow at the same asymptotic growth rate given by
g∗ =
C˙
C
=
A˙
A
=
Y˙
Y
=
1
σ
(
γL
η∗
− ρ
)
. (20)
Conditions (19) and the growth rate (20) are the same as those in (12) and (11)
respectively, only with the asymptotic value η∗ in place of the constant unit cost η.
Along the transition dynamics the consumption growth rate g in (18) may be either
larger or smaller than its asymptotic value g∗ in (20), depending on the (transition)
intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/εu (C), the (transition) knowledge cost η
and the sign of η˙/η, that is, on whether building new knowledge involves increasing
or decreasing costs as time elapses.
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When the cost of knowledge varies through time depending on the evolution of the
knowledge stock, externalities arise, but the households are not able to keep them
into account in their decision process, as they can only observe the ensuing price
changes, η˙ (t), embedded in the interest rate according to (16). Clearly, under these
circumstances the equilibrium described in Proposition 5.2 turns out to be not Pareto
optimal, as we now show by solving the social planner problem associated to (1).
Now we assume that the unit cost of new knowledge production η (t) has the form in
(13) and, as in Proposition 5.2, limt→+∞ η (t) = limt→+∞ ϕ [A (t)] = η
∗ > 0 when there
is knowledge growth, A˙ (t) /A (t) > 0. Following the same argument as in the proof
of Proposition 4.4 in the Appendix, the social planner first maximizes net output,
Y (t) − X (t) = A (t)Lf [x (t) /A (t)] − x (t)L, with respect to x (t), obtaining the
optimal net output Y S (t)−XS (t) = γLA (t). Then, she maximizes the representative
household’s lifetime discounted utility as in (1) subject to the resource constraint
γLA (t) = C (t) + J (t), which, according to (13) and (14), can be written as
A˙ (t) =
γLA (t)− C (t)
ϕ [A (t)]
. (21)
Denoting by λ (t) the costate variable associated to the unique dynamic constraint
(21) and dropping the time argument for simplicity, the current-value Hamiltonian of
the social planner problem is
H (A,C, λ) = u (C) + λ
γLA− C
ϕ (A)
.
Necessary conditions are
u′ (C) =
λ
ϕ (A)
(22)
λ˙ = ρλ− λ
γLϕ (A)− (γLA− C)ϕ′ (A)
[ϕ (A)]2
(23)
lim
t→+∞
λ (t)A (t) e−ρt = 0, (24)
where (24) is the transversality condition. Differentiating with respect to time (22)
one gets
λ˙
λ
=
ϕ′ (A) A˙
ϕ (A)
− εu (C)
C˙
C
, (25)
where εu (C), as usual, denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion. Coupling (25) with (23), using (21) and rearranging terms we obtain the following
transitory consumption growth rate:
gS (t) =
C˙ (t)
C (t)
=
1
εu [C (t)]
{
γL
ϕ [A (t)]
− ρ
}
. (26)
Also this version of the model exhibits transition dynamics; thus, we again look for
an ABGP type of equilibrium which turns out to be the same as that characterized in
Proposition 5.2.
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Proposition 5.3. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1, 3.3 and 5.1 with the specifica-
tion in (13) hold. Moreover assume that limt→+∞ {1/εu [C (t)]} = 1/σ, σ > 0, and
limt→+∞ ϕ [A (t)] = η
∗ > 0 whenever there is positive knowledge growth, A˙/A > 0.
Then, if conditions (19) hold, the social planner economy admits a unique ABGP along
which knowledge, output, and consumption all grow at the same asymptotic growth rate
characterized by the common constant growth rate as in (20) of Proposition 5.2 for
the decentralized economy.
Furthermore, along the transition dynamics the consumption growth rate in (26) can
be either larger or smaller than that in (18), specifically, gS > g when ϕ′ [A (t)] < 0,
while gS < g when ϕ′ [A (t)] > 0.
From Proposition 5.3 we conclude that, asymptotically, the equilibrium in the decen-
tralized model converges to the Pareto optimal solution. However, along the transition
dynamics the consumption growth rate under social planner supervision in (26) can
be either larger or smaller than that in the decentralized market economy in (18),
depending on the sign of ϕ′ [A (t)] which, in turn, determines the sign of the term
η˙ (t) /η (t) = ϕ′ [A (t)] A˙ (t) /ϕ [A (t)] in the square bracket of the RHS in (18). Indeed,
a social planner controls the whole evolution of the knowledge stock A (t) so that, with
a unit cost of new knowledge production as in (13), the externalities of investments in
knowledge leading to changes in ϕ [A (t)] through time are now taken into account.
Specifically, with costs that decrease in time, ϕ′ [A (t)] < 0, the growth rate in the
transitional period is larger under central control than in the decentralized model:
gS > g. This is due to the presence of a positive externality, that is, when knowledge
costs are decreasing in time, it becomes possible to produce subsequent inventions by
subtracting less and less resources from other uses. This external effect, however, is not
accounted for by private investors, while it is being considered by the central planner,
who, accordingly, chooses a larger growth rate gS in the transitional period.
Conversely, if ϕ′ [A (t)] > 0, the growth rate in the transitional period is smaller
under the social planner supervision than in the decentralized model: gS < g.
As inefficiencies arise in the transitional period under decentralization, corrective
policy interventions might be designed. That is, a subsidy to R&D investments along
the transition when ϕ′ [A (t)] < 0 (a tax when ϕ′ [A (t)] > 0) could be introduced to
align the behavior of decentralized agents to the path envisaged by the social planner.
We do not pursue here the detailed specification of such tools. It is interesting to note,
however, that, as long as a “stepping on toes effect” prevails (i.e., ϕ′ [A (t)] > 0), then
an alternative to taxation might be represented by a suitable time path of reductions
of the extent of rights granted to patent holders.21 This would entail a corresponding
expansion of the share of property rights on knowledge attributed to the cultural
endowment of workers and thus a shift of compensations in favor of the latter. This
approach could take care of efficiency (by suitably modulating the remuneration of
investments in R&D) and of equity, as the workers income share would increase.22
It is also evident from (11) and (20) that, as one expects, both the constant and
the variable cost of knowledge production versions of our simplified economy exhibit
the strong scale effect—the growth rate of the economy increases in population size–
as postulated by Jones (1995; 1999; 2005) for knowledge-based endogenous growth
models. This effect, which is not supported by empirical evidence, has prompted the
21This might correspond to the introduction of a limited duration of patents, an extension of the model that we
leave for future research. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this direction of further investigation.
22See Section 6 in the working paper version of this paper (Marchese and Privileggi 2016) for a worked out
example under different assumptions on the cost of knowledge production.
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elaboration of new models either semi-endogenous (as, e.g., in Jones 1995) or “second
generation ” endogenous (as, e.g., in Peretto 1998), or hybrid (Cozzi 2017). An exten-
sion of the model controlling for the scale effect in a framework of variable population
is reported in the working paper version of this paper (Marchese and Privileggi 2016).
6. Conclusions
The model presented in this paper, in addition to being simple, is based on assumptions
for the fundamentals of the economy that cover the broadest class of neoclassical
environments. Specifically, unlike most of the existing literature (including some papers
mentioned above) that requires peculiar functional forms like CIES (if not logarithmic)
preferences for the representative consumer and Leontief or Cobb-Douglas technologies
for the productive sector, our setting works for any increasing and concave utility
function with constant asymptotic intertemporal elasticity of substitution and CRS
production function exhibiting decreasing returns in each factor taken alone. Moreover,
also the creation of new knowledge in the R&D sector occurs according to a sufficiently
general family of technologies that include those already considered in the literature;
the only restriction is that these technologies asymptotically must envisage a constant
unit cost of production.
In this setting we take into account the increasingly immaterial characteristics as-
sumed by technological progress and the implications this has on the ways in which it
is transferred to final production. On this basis we thus assume that both a direct use
of ideas in final goods’ production and the revelation of firm’s willingness to pay for
accessing knowledge arise. A further feature that characterizes our model is the recon-
sideration of the role of labor. In our scenario cognitive tasks—traditionally performed
by medium or even high skilled workers—are embedded into routines and software,
and are thus automated. The truly creative activities are done by research firms under
the protection of IPR. As for the tasks traditionally performed by low-skilled workers,
they too are considered as based on models or routines. Firms demand these intellec-
tual contents “ embedded” in raw labor. Thus, both workers and patent holders supply
the same type of input—i.e., ideas, models of behavior, knowledge—while workers pro-
vide them jointly with raw labor. As knowledge growth occurs through investments in
patented innovations, an important implication of the model is a tendency toward the
compression of incomes paid to workers—which can reduce to the sole compensation
of the basic competencies—while the remaining income goes to patent holders.
We show that when one takes into account the aforementioned trends of recent
technological progress, competition becomes viable. Hence the economy can reach the
first best if knowledge, while being nonrival, is homogeneous and fully excludable when
used in final goods production. Even if partial excludability occurs, second best results
would be confined to the transitional period, while first best is reached all the same
in the long run.
Idea-based competitive growth models routinely assume that the R&D activity is
not protected by patents, so that the inventor cannot unduly restrict the exploitation
of her invention by others. In fact, in Hellwig and Irmen (2001) a patent would al-
low the inventor/producer of final goods to permanently prevent the spillover of the
productivity increases deriving from her invention and thus harm economic growth; in
Boldrin and Levine (2008) knowledge does not exist outside the private and excludable
goods in which it is embodied, so that granting a patent would simply allow the holder
a distortionary monopolistic right, not needed to finance the initial cost of invention.
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In our basic model, instead, the patent is at the same time useful and harmless. It is
useful because it gives the patent holder standard full property rights, so that the free
exploitation of research results—as happens in the Hellwig and Irmen model after the
information has leaked—cannot occur. Patents are harmless because the possibility
of restricting the embedding rival good (e.g., the copies, as in Boldrin and Levine)
does not arise, as knowledge is disembodied. Hence the property right granted by the
patent just plays the role of allowing the holders of the stock of knowledge to be paid
according to the latter’s social marginal benefit. Limitations to the rights granted by
patents, with a corresponding expansion of property rights on knowledge attributed
to workers, however, can be in order in the transitional period when new knowledge
production occurs under increasing costs. Stressing that competition is logically viable
in a growing economy with endogenous knowledge creation has important policy im-
plications, since it means that, e.g., regulatory and judicial interventions in the field
of patents and IPR can foster competition without fearing that a collapse of research
activities arises.
While the potential unwanted effects of technological progress have been often iden-
tified with the possible growth in unemployment due to the substitution of capital for
labor, these dire effects did not materialize in the last decades in advanced countries,
where unemployment—except for the financial crisis years—has not been the more
worrying problem. One of the prominent social concerns has actually been instead
the shrinking of labor income share. This paper provides a possible rationale for this
stylized fact, which does not fit well into standard growth models where the stability
of factors’ income shares is a tenet.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Clearly, the first condition in (12) implies that, accord-
ing to (11), g = C˙/C > 0. Differentiating with respect to time ln (Y ), with Y as in
(4), and recalling that, from (8), x/A ≡ δ is constant, it is immediately seen that
Y˙ /Y = A˙/A. Recall that, from (7), B = V A = ηA; hence, as under Assumption
3.2 both η and, by (10), the interest rate, r = γL/η, are constant the instantaneous
budget constraint in (1) can be rewritten as
A˙
A
=
1
η
(
γL−
C
A
)
, (27)
which implies that, in order to A˙/A be constant along the BGP, the ratio C/A on
the RHS must be constant as well, which is possible if and only if A˙/A = C˙/C = g.
Next, note that the second condition in (12) implies that r > g = A˙/A, so that the
transversality condition for problem (1), limt→+∞B (t) e
−rt = limt→+∞ ηA (t) e
−rt =
0, holds. Finally, for each A (t) the amount of the intermediate good is given by (8)
as x (t) = δA (t); therefore, in t = 0, x (0) = δA0 and the economy is immediately put
on the BGP.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The resource constraint of the economy at instant t is
C (t) + J (t) = Y (t)−X (t) , (28)
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where on the RHS we consider total output net of the intermediate goods, X (t) =
x (t)L. Dropping time dependency for simplicity, in order to obtain a dynamic con-
straint in the only variables A (state) and C (control) a social planner first considers
maximization of the net output Y − X = [Af (x/A)− x]L with respect to x for a
given stock A at instant t: the solution is xS = (f ′)−1 (1)A = δA, where the su-
perscript “S” denotes the level of per capita intermediate good chosen by the social
planner, which happens to be the same as in (8). Hence, net output turns out to be
Y S (t)−XS (t) = L [f (δ)− δ]A (t) = γLA (t), where in the last equality we used (9).
Under Assumption 3.2 J = ηA˙, and (28) can be rewritten as
A˙ (t) =
γ (t)LA (t)− C (t)
η
,
which, as B (t) = ηA (t) with η constant, turns out to be the same as the household’s
budget constraint in (1). Hence, the social planner problem is the same as (1) and has
the same equilibrium of Proposition 4.3 as solution.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. The arguments are the same as in the previous proof of
Proposition 4.3 and thus we omit them. The only difference is that now from (15)
B (t) = V (t)A (t) = η (t)A (t) holds, so that B˙ (t) = η˙ (t)A (t) + η (t) A˙ (t); however,
it is immediately seen that the instantaneous budget constraint in (1) at each instant
t remains the same as in (27), as, using (16) and rearranging terms,
A˙ (t)
A (t)
=
γL
η (t)
+
η˙ (t)
η (t)
−
η˙ (t)
η (t)
−
C (t)
η (t)A (t)
=
1
η (t)
[
γL−
C (t)
A (t)
]
.
When limt→+∞ η (t) = η
∗ > 0, η˙ (t) → 0 as t → +∞ and, according to (16),
limt→+∞ r (t) = r
∗ ≡ γL/η∗; thus, the second condition in (19) implies that r∗ >
g∗ = A˙/A, with g∗ defined in (20), so that the transversality condition for problem
(1), limt→+∞ η (t)A (t) e
−r(t)t = limt→+∞ η
∗A (t) e−r
∗t = 0, holds.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. When A˙/A > 0, limt→+∞ ϕ [A (t)] = η
∗ > 0 implies that
limt→+∞ ϕ
′ [A (t)] = 0, so that it is immediately seen that, as limt→+∞ [1/εu (C)] =
1/σ, the consumption growth rate in (26) asymptotically converges to that defined in
(20). As asymptotically the dynamic constraint (21) becomes equal to (27), the same
argument as in the proofs of Proposition 4.3 applies to establish that Y˙ /Y = A˙/A =
C˙/C = g∗ while the first condition in (19) implies that, according to (20), g∗ > 0. The
second condition in (19) is equivalent to (1− σ) g∗ < ρ, which, according to (25) and,
under (13), limt→+∞ [η˙ (t) /η (t)] = limt→+∞
{
ϕ′ [A (t)] A˙ (t) /ϕ [A (t)]
}
= 0, implies
lim
t→+∞
(
λ˙
λ
+
A˙
A
)
= lim
t→+∞
(
η˙
η
− σ
C˙
C
+
A˙
A
)
= (1− σ) g∗ < ρ,
thus ensuring that the transversality condition (24) holds.
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